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1 Introduction
For three decades, the income share of the top 1 percent earners in US has increased at an un-
precedented pace, climbing up from 8.18 percent in 1980 to 18.88 percent in 2012 (Alvaredo
et al., 2012). At the same time, the economy has witnessed the expansion of the financial sector
in terms of the share in GDP, the total employment and the average wage. Income from the as-
set market has become the growth engine for this industry since 1980. Finance also dominates
all other sectors in the top income earner category (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). Is that really a
coincidence that two themes synchronized with each other ?
This paper gives a novel insight that the introduction of new financial assets might be the
root of both themes. We build a simple model to explain why new assets can deepen the income
inequality trend and push up the share of the financial sector in the economy. New assets allow
the better risk-sharing between entrepreneurs in the different industries, making the access to
the financial market become more valuable. Entrepreneurs are ready to pay more for financiers
to make transactions in the financial market. Financiers themselves, due to the increase in the
number of assets, can also earn the higher income from actively trading in the asset market. As
the agents are risk averse, the more complete market also implies the higher rate of return on
capital, which in turn transmits and amplifies the cycle between the wealth inequality and the
income inequality.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, it gives a new explanation for the income
inequality trend and the rise of the financial sector in US by putting the asset market in the
main theme. There is a literature about the relationship between the development of finance and
the income inequality (see Galor and Zeira (1993) and Levine (1997)), but the theme rotates
around the credit market where intermediaries (banks) play the main role. This literature does
not match with the data from 1980 when nearly 50 percent of the growth of finance lies in the
subsector dealing with the asset market. Most closely related to our paper is the work of Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990), in which intermediaries pool and diversify the risk, leading to the
higher rate of return on capital and therefore deepening the income inequality. In our model,
risk-sharing is conducted in the decentralized asset market by allowing agents to trade a range
of assets. The income inequality in our model is widened when the number of assets increases
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while the model in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) predicts the income inequality eventually
declines with the development of finance.
Second, our model can explain the fact that more financiers go to the top income level. To
my limited knowledge, this is the first paper investigating this phenomenon theoretically. Bak-
ija, Cole and Heim (2008), by using the US income tax return data, show that the representation
of the finance industry in the top 1 percent earner has increased from 7.7 percent in 1979 to 13.2
percent in 2005. Some research, like Cagetti and Nardi (2006), Jones and Kim (2014), give the
insights why the income share of top entrepreneurs increases over years. However, there is a
big gap in the literature in explaining the rise of the financiers into the top income, which is
itself the main feature of the US inequality trend since 1980. New assets in our model generate
two inequality trends simultaneously: income is redistributed from entrepreneurs to financiers
and from low-wealth holders to top-wealth holders.
Our paper also touches the literature on financial innovation and security design. We follow
Simsek (2013) to model an economy with a list of financial assets. In an endowment economy,
Simsek (2013) illustrates the change in the portfolio risk from the appearance of the new assets.
We, on the other hand, emphasize the links between the financial and real sectors; so we can
evaluate the impact of new assets on the income distribution. We only concentrate into the risk
sharing motive in the financial market, like Allen and Gale (1994), Duffie and Rahi (1995).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces three stylized facts of the US econ-
omy since 1980 which motivates our theoretical model : the surge of Wall Street, the rise of the
income inequality and the appearance of many new assets in the market. Section 3 describes
our model. Section 4 gives some analytical results about the effect of new assets on the income
distribution. Section 5 does the quantitative exercise to illustrate the impact of new financial
assets on the income distribution.
3
2 The three macroeconomic themes since 1980
Theme 1: The rise of the financial sector, especially the subsector trading
in the asset market
From 1977 to 1997, the share of the finance industry in GDP increases from 4.7 percent to
7 percent, in which the subsector “Securities, commodity contracts, and investments” alone
contributes nearly half of this growth. This reflects a significant shift of the US financial sector
since 1980s. Facilitating transactions and actively trading in the asset market becomes a new
huge source of income for the financial sector beside the traditional role of providing credit to
the economy.
Figure 1 depicts the growth of the finance industry during 1977-1997 with the data from
BEA. If we break down the growth of the financial sector into four components, the sector
dealing with the asset market “Securities, commodity contracts, and investments” contributes
most to this growth (47 percent). The next one is the insurance sector (27 percent). Banking
sector and “Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles” contribute, respectively, 23 percent and
4 percent.
Figure 1: Share of subsectors of finance in GDP 1977-1997
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The dominance of the finance industry against the rest of the economy is also shown in the
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data about the average wage. After 1980, the relative wage between the finance industry and the
non-financial private sector also increases significantly. We normalize the average wage in the
non-financial private sector as 1. In 1997, the wage in finance is 1.5 times as much as the one
in the non-financial industry. The relative wage is very stable at 1 before 1980, indicating no
difference between the average wage in finance and the other private sector. The upward trend
after 1980 is again explained by the rocketing increase in the average wage of brokers in the
financial market. Figure 2 documents the change in the relative wage.
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The calculation is based on Annual Industry Account data. The average wage is calcu-
lated as the ratio between total compensation of employees and the number of full-time
equivalent employees. The average wage of non-finance private industry is normal-
ized as 1. To compare data under SIC72 and SIC87, we define “credit intermediation”
such that it comprises of sector coded 60 and 61 in SIC72 and sector coded 60 and 61
in SIC87.
Figure 2: The wage of the financial sector 1947-1997
Theme 2: The rise of top 1% income earners and the surge of Wall Street
in top 1%
Another salient macroeconomic feature after 1980 is the rise of top 1%’s income share in US.
According to Piketty and Saez (2003), the top 1%’s income share goes up from 7.9% to 18.33%
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during the period 1977-2007. This surge again is contributed significantly by the rise of Wall
Street financiers in top 1%, and especially in top 0.1%. According to Kaplan and Rauh (2010),
Wall Street financiers comprise a higher percentage of the top income brackets than non finan-
cial executives of public companies. Using the microdata from Current Population Survey, we
compare the distribution of income between people working in finance and non-financial in-
dustry in two years 1977 and 2007. (Incomes of different years are converted to the equivalent
incomes in 1999)
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Figure 3: The distribution of income
According to the Figure 3, two points are worth considering. First, both the income dis-
tributions shift right and have a larger right tail than before, referring to the concentration of
income to a small amount of top earners. Second, in any cutoff income points in the right tail
of the distribution, the density of top earners in finance is much higher than the general density
of top earners in non-financial industry. This, in combination with the rise of finance’s share in
total income and total employment, give us the conclusion about the rapid surge of Wall Street
in top income earners.
Based on income tax return data reported by Bakija, Cole and Heim (2008), the percent-
age of executives, managers and supervisors (non-finance) in the top 1% in fact declined from
35.3% in 1979 to 30% in 2005, while the percentage of financiers increased by 5.5% during this
time. This trend also happens with the top 0.1%, emphasizing the need of economic theory to
explain this phenomenon. Table 1 documents the rise of financiers in the top income in US.
6
Table 1: Percentage of primary taxpayers in top 1% and top 0.1 % of the
distribution of income (including capital gains) that are in each occupation
Year
Top 1 percent Top 0.1 percent
Executives,
managers,
supervisors
(non-finance)
Financial
professions,
including
management
Others
Executives,
managers,
supervisors
(non-finance)
Financial
professions,
including
management
Others
1979 35.3 7.7 57.0 48.1 11.0 40.9
1993 33.3 10.8 55.9 45.7 14.1 40.2
1997 33.2 11.9 54.9 48.4 14.7 36.9
1999 32.7 12.8 54.5 47.1 16.4 36.5
2001 31.0 13.1 55.9 42.6 19.1 38.3
2002 30.8 13.0 56.2 40.6 19.0 40.4
2003 30.2 12.9 56.9 40.5 17.8 41.7
2004 30.0 13.4 56.6 40.9 18.7 40.4
2005 30.0 13.2 56.8 42.5 18.0 39.5
Theme 3: The debut of new financial instruments
The most remarkable change in the financial market during 1980s was the increase in trading
volume of a wide range of new financial derivatives. Many financial products, like options or
futures contract, started becoming popular and useful tools for firms in managing risk since
1980. Table 2 shows the aggregate daily trading volume of major options contracts in the world
market.
Table 2: Aggregate Daily Trading Volume (Billion USD)
1975 1980 1984 1985 1986:III
Options 0 0 8.2 24.5 34.4
Interest rate contracts 0 0 1.9 11.5 16.3
Bonds 0 0 1.9 6.5 6.7
Money market 0 0 0 5.0 9.6
Stock index contracts 0 0 6.0 12.3 15.6
Currencies 0 0 0.3 0.7 2.5
Source: Levich et al. (1988)
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Beside options and futures, many types of asset backed securities (ABS) also made their
debut during 1980s. The first ABS was introduced in 1985 when the Sperry Lease Finance
Corporation created securities backed by its computer equipment leases. After that, the financial
market introduced many types of ABS with the underlying assets ranged from automobile loans,
credit card loans to student loans. Mortgage backed securities also transform the role of banks
from lenders to middlemen, allowing different industries to participate in the mortgage market.
In 1990s, credit default swap appeared in the market. Allen and Gale (1994) emphasizes the
biggest motivation for the introduction of many new financial instruments is risk sharing. In
the following section, we build a model to explain the link between new financial assets, risk
sharing and the income inequality trend we observed since 1980.
3 The model
3.1 The Environment
Consider an economy with two dates, t = 0,1, and one single good which can be used as either
capital or consumption. Except by using this good in the production technology, it cannot be
stored to the next period. There are two types of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs and
financiers.
Entrepreneurs: There is a continuum measure of 1 of entrepreneurs in each sector i ∈
I = {1,2, ..., |I|}. Entrepreneurs cannot move across sectors. Sectors differ from each other by
the risk structure in production. The entrepreneurs in the same sector i have different initial
endowments (initial wealth) e at date 0, where e follows a continuous distribution function
with the density f (e) on the support [e, e¯]. So an entrepreneur can be denoted by a pair (i,e),
where i shows his sector and e shows his initial endowment level. Let e˜ =
e¯∫
e
e f (e)de be the
average initial endowment of each sector at date 0, then the total endowment of economy is Ie˜.
Entrepreneurs receive no additional endowments at date 1.
At date 0, the entrepreneur, before making his decision about production, is matched to a
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financier who can help him to access the financial market1. If the entrepreneur agrees to pay
the bargained fees for the financier at date 1, he can purchase or short sell the financial assets
before going into the production stage.
An entrepreneur has a CARA utility function over his net worth ni,e at the end of date 1:
UE = E[−exp(−θni,e)]
where θ is the coefficient of risk aversion, θ > 0.
Financiers: There is a mass I of financiers in the economy. Financiers cannot produce; but
they can make transactions in the asset market or help entrepreneurs to make transactions there.
We assume that financiers do not have any endowments at date 0 and date 1. A financier also
has a CARA utility function over his net worth at the end of date 1 like entrepreneurs:
UF = E[−exp(−θnF)]
Production Technology and Risk Structure: We model the risk and asset structure similar
to Simsek (2013). A fundamental risk (or uncertainty) in the economy is captured by the m-
dimensional random vector v = (v1, ...,vm)′, which follow the multivariate normal distribution
v ∼ N(µ ,Ω), where µ ∈ Rm+. The risk when producing in the sector i is characterized by a
random variable Wi′v, where Wi ∈ Rm. As v follows a multivariate normal distribution, W′iv
follows a normal distribution. An entrepreneur, if investing k > 0 amount of capital in the
production at date 0, can produce the amount of output y at date 1 as:
y =
(
W′iv+ z
)
kη ,
1
2
≤ η < 1
where z > 0 is the parameter indicating the general productivity level of the economy, η is the
coefficient showing the level of control. We assume that capital is totally depreciated.
The production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. The normal distribution of the
sector shock has a lot of advantages when we introduce the asset market. The only problem is
1All results of this paper still hold if we assume that entrepreneur can always access to a set of financial assets
as the subset of the one that financiers can access
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the output can be negative. However, if we let the the value of the general productivity level z
be big enough, for example more than 10 times the standard deviation of the shock W′iv, the
probability of y < 0 is almost 0. This setup of the risk structure makes the model simple and
tractable.
Matching between financiers and entrepreneurs: At the beginning of date 0. financiers
and entrepreneurs are matched randomly 1-to-1. Here we assume the mass of financiers is equal
to the mass of entrepreneurs, so everyone is matched.2 If an entrepreneur meets a financier, his
type (i,e) is observed. To access the financial market, the entrepreneur must pay fees for the
financier. They go into the Nash bargaining process with α is the bargaining power of the
entrepreneur . The bargained fees wi,e will depend on the type of entrepreneur and only be paid
at date 1. The fees here should be interpreted as the sum of consulting fees, servicing fees and
transaction fees. In equilibrium, every entrepreneur will participate in the asset market.
Asset Market: There are bonds and H assets in the market, H + 1 < m. A bond promises
to pay 1 unit of goods at date 1. The inverse price of a bond is s, which is endogenous. It means
that 1 unit of goods at date 0 can exchange for s units of bonds.
Unlike bonds, the payoffs of assets are uncertain. Each asset h promises to give a random
payoff ah = A′hv at date 1, where Ah ∈Rm. So the payoff of an asset depends on the realization
of the fundamental risk v. The vectors, {Ah}h=1,...,H , are linearly independent which ensures
no assets are redundant. We can say the asset matrix A = [A1 A2 ... AH]m×H is full rank.
The price vector of assets is p ∈ RH , which is endogenous. The total net supply of assets and
bonds are both 0 in equilibrium (we allow agents to short sell in the financial market).
Timing: The timing of events can be summarized as followings:
t = 0 :
• Entrepreneurs and financiers are matched and they go into the bargaining process.
• Financiers and entrepreneurs make transactions in the asset market.
• Production stage: entrepreneurs make decisions about production.
t = 1 :
2This assumption can be relaxed by letting the number of matches between financiers and entrepreneurs follows
a standard matching function in search theory..
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• Fundamental risk v is realized.
• Outputs are realized; agents receive the payoffs from the financial assets and bonds; en-
trepreneurs pay the committed fees to financiers.
Like Simsek (2013), we assume there is no default in the model. That assumption is justified
if the fluctuation of fundamental risk is small enough. It is also standard in the literature of
general equilibrium model with a set of financial assets.
3.2 The entrepreneur’s problem:
When bargaining fees with the financier, the entrepreneur treats the price in the financial market
as given and compares the change in his utility in two cases: with and without access to the
financial market.
No access to the financial market
Let kUi,e be the capital the entrepreneur of type (i,e) will put into the production if he cannot get
access to the financial market. The the entrepreneur problem is:
VUi,e = max
kUi,e
E[−exp(−θnUi,e)]
subject to
nUi,e = (W
′
iv+ z)(k
U
i,e)
η (1)
0≤ kUi,e ≤ e (2)
As W′iv follows the normal distribution, [exp(−θnUi,e)] follows the log-normal distribution. Un-
der the CARA preference, we can rewrite the problem as:
max
kUi,e
E(nUi,e)−
θ
2
Var(nUi,e)
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subject to the the constraints (1) and (2).
Let σi be the variance of the shock in the sector i, then σi =W′iΩWi. The mean and variance
of entrepreneur’s net worth in this case are:
E(nUi,e) = (W
′
iµ + z)(k
U
i,e)
η
Var(nUi,e) = (k
U
i,e)
2ηW′iΩWi = (k
U
i,e)
2ησi
As the entrepreneur is risk averse, he must consider the trade-off between the expected
return from the production and his sector risk σi- the variance of the shock in the sector i.
Without access to the financial market, he must bear the risk himself. Lemma 1 shows the
unique solution for the entrepreneur.
Lemma 1. The solution for the entrepreneur (i,e) in case of no access to the financial market
is:
kUi,e = min{kˆUi,e,e}
where
kˆUi,e =
(
W′iµ + z
θσi
)1/η
In equilibrium, every entrepreneur will pay financiers to get access to the financial market
so VUi,e only plays the role as the reference point to identify the bargaining fees.
With access to the financial market
If the entrepreneur participates in the asset market, he can buy bonds and assets to hedge the
risk when producing in the sector i. Let xhi,e be the position of the entrepreneur (i,e) on the asset
h. Let xi,e be the vector showing his position for all H assets and ki,e be the capital invested in
the production. The entrepreneur problem can be written as:
Vi,e = max
ki,e,xi,e
E[−exp(−θni,e)]
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subject to
ni,e = (e− ki,e−xi,e′p)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bond Payoffs
+(W′iv+ z)(ki,e)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
Production
+ xi,e′A′v︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset Payoffs
− wi,e︸︷︷︸
Fees for financier
(3)
Like the case of no access to the financial market, the problem can be rewritten in the mean-
variance form:
max
ki,e,xi,e
E(ni,e)− θ2Var(ni,e)
And the mean and variance of net worth are:
E(ni,e) = (e− ki,e−xi,e′p)s+(W′iµ + z)(ki,e)η +xi,e′A′µ −wi,e
Var(ni,e) = σi(ki,e)2η +xi,e′ΩAxi,e+2xi,e′λ i(ki,e)η
where λ i = A′ΩWi is the covariance between the risk in the sector i and the asset payoffs,
ΩA = A′ΩA is the variance-covariance of assets’ payoffs matrix.
The capability of making transactions in the asset market adds two layers to the entrepreneur’s
decision. First, he can borrow and lend through the bond market or short-sell through the asset
market, so the resource restriction is no longer binding. Second, he can hedge the production
risk through the asset market. His capital investment still depends on the sector risk σi; but it
also depends on the asset market. He wants to buy more asset h if it offers him the high ex-
pected return (A′µ −ps) or its return is negative correlated to his sector risk λ i. His decision
also depends on the variance-covariance of all asset payoffs ΩA. Gaining access to the asset
market helps the entrepreneurs to hedge the risk better and therefore leveraging and investing
more into the risky production process.
Assumption 1 ensures that market is incomplete, so that entrepreneurs could not share all
the idiosyncratic risks through trading H assets.
Assumption 1. σi 6= λ ′iΩ−1A λ i, ∀i = 1, ..., I
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1 and s > 0, the solution for the entrepreneur (i,e) if he can
access to the financial market is unique. Let β = 1/η , his capital choice ki,e and portfolio
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choice xi,e are the solution of the following system:
(W′iµ + z)− sβ (ki,e)η(β−1)−θσi(ki,e)η −θxi,e′λ i = 0 (4)
(A′µ −ps)−θ
(
ΩAxi,e+(ki,e)ηλ i
)
= 0 (5)
It is also easy to see that the value of gaining access to the financial market (less the fees
paid to the financier) is always greater than (or at least equal to) the autarky case. Moreover, the
decision rules for invested capital ki,e and portfolio xi,e do not depend on the initial endowment
level e.
3.3 The financier:
Financiers can alway access and make transactions in the financial market. The financier’s
problem can also be written in the mean-variance trade-off like the entrepreneurs. Financiers
solve:
max
xF
E(nF)− θ2Var(nF)
subject to
nF = (−x′Fp)s+x′FA′v+wi,e (6)
Lemma 3. The mean and variance of financiers’ net worth are:
E(nF) = (−x′Fp)s+x′FA′µ +wi,e
Var(nF) = xF′ΩAxF
The solution for financiers is:
xF =
Ω−1A (A
′µ −ps)
θ
(7)
Unlike the entrepreneurs, the financiers only care about the expected return of asset payoffs
(A′µ −ps) and the variance-covariance of asset’s payoff (ΩA). The purpose of the financiers
when holding risky assets is fundamentally different from the entrepreneurs’ choice. There is
no hedging motivation there, the financiers hold the risky assets to earn the positive income
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from making transactions in the financial market.
3.4 Fee bargaining:
When an entrepreneur (i,e) meets a financier, his type is observed by the financier. They treat
the bond price s and asset prices p in the financial market as given and go into Nash bargaining.
Recall Vi,e, VUi,e are the indirect utilities of the entrepreneur in case he can and cannot access
the financial market. Let VF , V NF be respectively the indirect utility of the financier in case of
bargaining is successful and not. We shorten the notation as all indirect utility functions depend
on p and s.
Let Vˆi,e be the indirect utility of the entrepreneur if he can access the asset market without
paying fees to the financier.
Vˆi,e =−exp(−θ nˆi,e)
where nˆi,e = (e− ki,e−x′i,ep)s+(Wi′µ + z)(ki,e)η +x′i,eA′µ
Then Vi,e = exp(θwi,e)Vˆi,e. We also have VF = exp(−θwi,e)V NF . With the entrepreneur’s bar-
gaining power as α (0 < α < 1), the bargained fees will solve this problem:
max
wi,e
(
exp(θwi,e)Vˆi,e−VUi,e
)α(
exp(−θwi,e)V NF −V NF
)1−α
Lemma 4. The bargain fee w∗i,e is:
exp(θw∗i,e) =
2α−1
2α
+
√√√√(2α−1
2α
)2
+
(1−α)
α
(
VUi,e
Vˆi,e
)
In the special case α = 1/2, then:
w∗i,e =
1
2
[(
E(nˆi,e)− θ2Var(nˆi,e)
)
−
(
E(nUi,e)−
θ
2
Var(nUi,e)
)]
Like all the other Nash bargaining problems, the bargained fee is set up to divide the total
surplus from the successful match. As Vˆi,e ≥VUi,e , all matches are successful in equilibrium.
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4 Equilibrium:
Definition: Market equilibrium consists of asset price vector p and bond price s > 0, an alloca-
tion {ki,e}, a vector of asset holdings {{xi,e},xF}, and the fees {wi,e} such that:
(i) Given p and s, {ki,e,xi,e} solves the problem of the entrepreneur of type (i,e); {xF} solves
the problem of financiers; {wi,e} solves the problem of fee bargaining between entrepreneurs
and financiers.
(iii) All markets clear:
Asset Market:
I
∑
i=1
 e¯∫
e
xi,e f (e)de
+ IxF = 0 (8)
Goods Market:
I
∑
i=1
 e¯∫
e
ki,e f (e)de
= Ie˜ (9)
This paper only considers the market equilibrium when the inverse bond price is positive
(bonds will exist in equilibrium). When the amount of endowment is bigger than the level
economy can absorb, the risk averse entrepreneurs might want to get rid of excess resources
rather than put it into the production function (see Lemma 1). In this case, s≤ 0. However, the
Assumption 2 ensures that the case with negative s will not happen.
Assumption 2. The total endowment of the economy satisfies:
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)−θσi(σ˜iIe˜)η > 0; where σ˜i =
σ1/(1−η)i
∑Ij=1σ
1/(1−η)
j
4.1 The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium in two steps. First, we prove that
the set of allocation of market equilibria (if exist) is identical to the set of solutions of a problem
faced by a social planner. Second, we prove the solution for the social planner’s problem is
unique; and, therefore, the market equilibrium exists and must be unique. We can also recover
all the prices in the market equilibrium from the social planner’s problem.
Assume there is a social planner who wants to maximize the aggregate certainty equivalent
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net worth of the whole economy Y , which is defined by:
Y =
 I∑
i=1
e¯∫
e
(
E(ni,e)− θ2Var(ni,e)
)
f (e)de
+ I(E(nF)− θ2Var(nF)
)
(10)
The social planner takes the structure of assets as given and chooses the portfolios as well
as the capital invested in the production for each agent. However, she faces four constraints.
First, she must allocate the capital invested in the production and the portfolios for all agents
in the same sector identically. It means that ki,e = ki and xi,e = xi. Second, the total allocated
capital must be less than or equal to the available endowment in date 0. Third, the portfolios for
all agents must satisfy the net supply of assets equal to 0. Fourth, she could not interfere and
reallocate the agents’ income at date 1.
Lemma 5. A social planner’s problem can be defined as
max
ki,xi
Y =
[
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)(ki)
η − θ
2
(
σi(ki)2η +xi′ΩAxi+2(ki)ηxi′λ i
)]
− θ I
2
x′FΩAxF
subject to
I
∑
i=1
ki ≤ Ie˜
I
∑
i=1
xi+ IxF = 0
Then under the Assumptions (1), the social planner’s solution is unique.
Theorem 1. Under the Assumptions (1)-(2), the market equilibrium exists and is unique.
We can also recover the inverse price of bond in the market equilibrium from solving the
social planner’s problem. From the proof of Theorem 1, the Lagrangian multiplier for the
resource constraint in the solution of social planner problem is s. In the following sections, we
analyze the impact of new assets on the income distribution in the economy.
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4.2 New assets and the rise of the financial sector
We characterize the change in the economy and in the financial sector if the list of assets ex-
pands. An economy can be denoted by ξ = ({Wi}Ii=1, {Ah}Hh=1). Assume there is a new addi-
tional asset AH+1 for trading, the new economy can be denoted by ξ ′ = ({Wi}Ii=1, {Ah}H+1h=1 ).
We make the following assumption for this new asset.
Assumption 3. AH+1 ∈ Rm, AH+1 6∈ span({A1,A2, ...,AH}).
This assumption makes sure the new asset is not redundant and the asset matrix is still full
rank. Now we characterize the rise of the financial sector when a new asset is added. Let
YF be the “adjusted” certainty equivalent (CE) net worth of all financiers (YF contains all the
consulting fees but only half of financiers’ transaction income) and ϕ be the share of YF in total
economy:
YF =
( I
∑
i=1
e¯∫
e
wi,e f (e)de︸ ︷︷ ︸
Financier’s wages
)
+
I
2
(
(−x′Fp)s+x′FA′µ −
θ
2
x′FΩAxF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Half of CE financiers’ transaction income
)
(11)
ϕ =
YF
Y
(12)
Theorem 2. If both economies ξ and ξ ′ satisfy the Assumption (1)-(2), the new asset satisfies
the Assumption 3 and the bargaining power of entrepreneur α = 0.5, then:
(i) The certainty equivalent net worth of the whole economy Y ′ in (ξ ′) is greater than or
equal to Y in (ξ ).
(ii) The certainty equivalent net worth of all financier Y ′F in (ξ ′) is greater than or equal to
YF in (ξ ).
(iii) The financial sector’s share ϕ is (weakly) increasing when the economy transforms from
(ξ ) to (ξ ′).
Theorem 2 shows the rise of the financial sector when a new asset is added in the economy.
The appearance of the new financial asset can increase the risk-sharing efficiency; therefore,
it raises the value of being accessed to the financial market. Entrepreneurs are ready to pay
18
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Figure 4: The financiers’ fees income and transaction income
more for the financiers to hedge their risks in production. So the fees wi,e increase to reflect
the benefit from accessing the financial market to entrepreneurs. Intuitively, if the CE net worth
of the whole economy Y increases due to the innovation in the financial sector, financiers will
capture half of this gain in the Nash bargaining process with entrepreneurs.
What do we know about the financiers’ expected transaction income x′F(A
′µ − sp) when
new assets appear? First, it is surely not negative, otherwise they would be better by not making
transaction xF = 0. While entrepreneurs join the financial market to hedge the production risk,
financiers join the market to earn the transaction income.
Second, the change in the financiers’ transaction income depends on the risk correlation
between the production sectors. Let’s assume that the economy has two production sector
I = 2. If the risk of two production sectors are perfectly negative correlated, transaction income
is always zero; and fees income are increasing with the appearance of new asset (Figure 4a).
In the opposite case, when risk of two sectors are extremely positive correlated, the financier’s
transaction income is generally increasing with the appearance of new assets as there are more
financial tools for financiers to share risks with the production sectors (Figure 4b). We formalize
two above ideas for some specific economies.
Lemma 6. If the risks of two production sectors are perfectly negative correlated I = 2, W1+
W2 = 0 and W′1µ =W
′
2µ = 0, then financiers’ expected transaction income x
′
F(A
′µ −sp) = 0.
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To illustrate for the change in the financiers’ transaction income when the risks of two
production sectors are perfectly positive correlated, we consider the case when two sectors are
identical W1 = W2, or we can consider I=1.
Lemma 7. If both economies ξ and ξ ′ satisfy the Assumption (1)-(2), the new asset satisfies the
Assumption 3 and I = 1, then financiers’ expected transaction income x′F(A
′µ − sp) is weakly
increasing when the economy transforms from (ξ ) to (ξ ′).
4.3 New assets and the rise of income inequality
New assets also deepen the income inequality in the economy. From the result of Theorem 2,
new assets can transfer the income from entrepreneurs to financiers. This creates the income
inequality between the finance industry and non-finance industries. However, new assets also
widen the income gap within entrepreneurs. New assets allow the better chance to hedge the
risk in the production, pushing up the capital demand and therefore the rate of return on capital
s and the income share of top wealth holders.
To see the mechanism clearly, we consider the economy with two production sectors with
perfectly negative risk correlation I = 2, W1+W2 = 0 and W′1µ = W
′
2µ = 0, then λ 1 =−λ 2
and k∗1 = k
∗
2 (result in the proof of Lemma 6). Risk sharing in this economy is conducted
between two sectors. Solving the social planner problem with bond price s as the Lagrangian
multiplier with the resource constraint, we get: (equation 28 in the Appendix)3
(W′iµ + z)− sβ (k∗i )1−η = θσi(k∗i )η −
θ
2
(k∗i )
ηλ ′iΩ
−1
A λ i, i = 1,2
Recall that β = 1/η , multiply both sides by η(k∗i )η−1:
(W′iµ + z)η(k
∗
i )
η−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit
=
Give up bond payoffs︷ ︸︸ ︷
s +
Production Risk︷ ︸︸ ︷
θσiη(k∗i )
2η−1−
Risk Sharing︷ ︸︸ ︷
θ
2
η(k∗i )
2η−1λ ′iΩ
−1
A λ i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost
(13)
3The detail derivation is conducted in the proof of the Theorem 1.
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The above equation shows the capital demand in each sector in the economy. The left
hand side of (13) is the marginal benefit for entrepreneurs from investing one more unit of
capital in the production. The right hand side could be considered as the marginal cost of
putting capital into the production. The first component of this cost is the opportunity cost from
giving up the chance to buy bonds. This second component is associated with the risk-averse
attitude of entrepreneurs, as more investment means the higher risk. However, this cost can be
reduced if the list of financial assets allows the entrepreneurs to hedge the production risk. The
effect of new asset on the capital demand comes from the increase of the risk-sharing effect
(θ/2)η(k∗i )2η−1λ
′
iΩ
−1
A λ i, when entrepreneurs have more financial instrument tools to hedge
their production risk.
First, we prove formally the important result about the impact of new asset on the right hand
side of (13). From now, we use the notation aˆ for variable (or parameter) a in the economy (ξ )
and a˜ for variable (or parameter) a in (ξ ′).
As the risk structures in two sectors are symmetric, we have σ1 = σ2 and λ ′1Ω
−1
A λ 1 =
λ ′2Ω
−1
A λ 2. We drop the subscript i to shorten the notation.
Lemma 8. Let Ω˜A, ΩˆA be respectively the variance-covariance payoffs of assets in the economy
(ξ ′) and (ξ ). Then, under the Assumption (3) and H +1 < m:
Ω˜−1A −
 Ωˆ
−1
A 0
0′ 0

 is positive semidefinite
One direct result we get from Lemma 8 is:
λˆ
′
Ωˆ−1A λˆ =
 λˆ
A′H+1ΩW

′ Ωˆ
−1
A 0
0′ 0

 λˆ
A′H+1ΩW
≤ λ˜ Ω˜−1A λ˜
For the case two symmetric sectors, under the Assumption (2), the total capital demand will
equate the total capital supply Ie˜ in equilibrium, or k∗1 = k
∗
2 = e˜. With the appearance of new
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Figure 5: The effect of new assets on capital return
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asset, the only way to balance the equation (13) is the inverse bond price s must go up. Intu-
itively, because new financial securities allow the better risk sharing between two sectors, the
capital demand increases. While the total supply of capital in inelastic at Ie˜, the rate of return
on capital s will go up.
Figure 5 shows the effect of the new assets on the inverse bond price. The introduction of
new financial assets shift the capital demand to the right, raising up the inverse of bond price.
This implies that the people in the top of the wealth distribution enjoy the bigger chunk in GDP
as their capital income increases. Recall that the difference between the net worth at date 1 of
two entrepreneurs in the same sector with initial wealth e1 and eN will be (eN−e1)s (as they will
chose the same portfolio and capital invested); therefore, the new financial assets, by increasing
s, also deepen the income inequality from the initial wealth inequality. The entrepreneurs with
the low initial wealth must borrow the capital with the higher interest rate while the one with
high initial wealth enjoys the higher income from lending capital. The higher rate of return on
capital creates the inequality cycle when transmitting the wealth inequality to income inequality
and reverse.
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Figure 6: The effect of new assets on the income distribution
To see it clearly, let y(e) be the expected income of all entrepreneurs with the initial endow-
ment e and the financiers who are matched to them. We know that transaction income and the
fees from the financial market only transfer from members in this group, so it does not affect
the expected income of the whole group. The capital invested in equilibrium will be ki,e = e˜.
We have:
y(e) = (e− e˜)s+
2
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)e˜
η = (e− e˜)s+2ze˜
Let y be the expected GDP of the economy, then:
y = 2ze˜
For the group in the bottom of wealth distribution, e < e˜. The increase in s reduces their income
while the group at the top of wealth distribution e¯> e˜ enjoys the bigger share in GDP. The effect
of new assets on the distribution of income can be summarized by the Figure 6.
The introduction of new financial assets increases the income share of financiers in GDP. It
also pushes up the share of top wealth people in the country. Although the model is very simple,
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it matches two income inequality trends we observe from the 1980: the rapid rise of top wealth
people as well as many top financial executives in the top 0.1% income in the economy.
5 Numerical Example
5.1 Calibration
In our numerical example, we set up the number of sector I = 2. Each sector in the model
consists of 28 industries in the data from BEA. The sector 1 contains all the industries in the
manufacturing sector and the agriculture sector. The sector 2 contains all the industries in the
service sector. The total number of industries is 56. This list of 56 industries is ordered in a way
such that all the industries belonging to sector 1 are in the odd positions.4
We calibrate the fundamental risk based on the industry risk in the data. The dimension of
fundamental risk m= 56, where each vi represents the risk of one industry. The vector W1=[1 0
1 0 ... 1 0]’ showing the risk for the sector 1 is set up to have zero in the even positions and 1 in
the odd position. It means that sector 1’s risk (W1v = v1+ v3+ ...+ v55) only contains the risk
of 28 industries in the odd positions. Similarly, the vector W2=[0 1 ... 0 1]’ showing the risk
for sector 2 means that the sector 2 only contains the risk of 28 industries in the even positions
in the list.
Naturally, the entry (i, j) of matrix Ω shows the covariance between the risk of industry i
and the risk of industry j in the data. However, this calibration must introduce a matrix data
of size 56×56, which means that model depends on more than 1,000 parameters . We choose
the alternative way to calibrate Ω, so it only depends on two parameters. We estimate the
covariance matrix of output growth between 56 industries in US between 1970-1982, the period
before new financial instruments appear. Then we calculate the average covariance between the
growth of two industries, which is 1.05e−04. We set up all entries Ω(i, j) = 1.05e−04, where
i 6= j. For all the diagonal entries, we set Ω(i, i) = 39e− 04, which is the average variance of
4The particular order does not matter to the trend in our result. We choose this order so the set of assets insure
the risks for both sectors.
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growth of 56 industries. We set µ = 0. 5
The asset matrix A in this experiment is set up so that asset h can fully insure the risk in the
industry h. In this way Ah is the unit vector with the entry in the position h equal to 1.
For the production function, the level of span of control η is set to equal 0.9 and the general
productivity z is set at 1.38 to match with the target that return on capital in the economy with
only bond is around 7 percent in 1980.
The wealth distribution of entrepreneurs is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution with
density:
f (e) =
ςeς
eς+1
We calibrate ς and e to satisfy two conditions. First, the aggregate wealth e˜ of each sector is 1.
Second, the initial wealth share of the top 1% entrepreneurs is 24% to match the data in 1980
from Saez and Zucman (2014). The parameters are summarized in the Table 3.
Table 3: Parameter values
Param. Value Note
m 56 Dimension of fundamental risk
I 2 Number of sectors
θ 1 Risk aversion coefficient
z 1.38 General technology level
η 0.9 Span of control level
α 0.5 Bargaining power of entrepreneurs
e 0.29 Scale of initial wealth distribution
ς 1.42 Shape of initial wealth distribution
5.2 Results
We start from the economy with only bonds (zero assets) and keep adding the new asset into the
economy and calculate the new equilibrium. As the dimension of fundamental risk is m = 56,
5We experimented with the model when Ω(i, j) matches the real variance-covariance matrix of 56 industries in
data and the asset matrix is random, all the trends of results are identical to our simplified version.
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the market is complete when we have 56 assets. All results are calculated in the expected value
as the actual income of agents in the economy at date 1 depends on the realization of shock v.
Table 4 shows the main statistics of the economy when the financial innovations happen.
Table 4: The change in economy with new financial assets
No of assets
(H)
Rate of
return on
capital (s)
GDP
Share of
finance in
GDP
Share of top
0.1% en-
trepreneurs
Share of top
0.1%
financiers
0 1.072 2.76 11.06 11.88 8.24
1 1.075 2.76 11.21 11.91 8.27
2 1.078 2.76 11.35 11.93 8.30
3 1.081 2.76 11.49 11.96 8.33
4 1.084 2.76 11.63 11.98 8.35
5 1.087 2.76 11.75 12.00 8.38
6 1.089 2.76 11.88 12.02 8.40
7 1.091 2.76 12.00 12.04 8.42
8 1.094 2.76 12.11 12.06 8.45
9 1.096 2.76 12.22 12.08 8.47
10 1.098 2.76 12.32 12.10 8.49
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
54 1.155 2.76 15.01 12.58 9.02
55 1.156 2.76 15.05 12.59 9.03
56 1.157 2.76 15.09 12.60 9.04
There are three important observations. First, the expected level of GDP does not change
with the introduction of new assets. In our model, the technology level remains constant; there-
fore, the introduction of new assets mainly affects the welfare and the distribution of income
rather than the level of output. Second, new assets increase the income share of the financial
sector in the economy. In our simulation, ten new assets can increase the share of the finance in-
dustry by 4%. Third, the top-wealth entrepreneur and the top financiers enjoy the bigger chunk
of GDP when the financial innovation happens. The income share of entrepreneurs at bottom in
fact shrinks. That replicates the two important income inequality trends we observe since 1980:
the rise of financiers and top 0.1% in wealth.
To see the income inequality trend more clearly, we take the economy with only bonds as
the benchmark and calculate the income growth of top 0.1% entrepreneurs by wealth, top 0.1%
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financiers (who are matched with top 0.1% entrepreneurs) and the entrepreneurs at the bottom
10% when the number of assets increases. Figure 7 displays the income growth of three groups
of agents with the financial innovations. The introduction of new assets benefits the top fi-
nanciers most. Compared to the economy with only bonds, the income of top financiers grows
by 28 percent if the market becomes complete. This explains the dominance of Wall Street
against Main Street observed in the empirical research by Kaplan and Rauh (2010) since 1980.
The top wealth entrepreneurs also enjoys the higher growth of income due to the higher rate of
return on capital; however, their income growth is less than the top financiers. The agents at the
bottom of wealth ladder suffer the decline in income share.
We break down the financiers’ income into two parts to understand more clearly the force
behind the rise of the financial sector. In our model, financiers have two sources of income: the
consulting fees is paid from entrepreneurs and the income they earn from making transaction
in the financial market. Both income sources go up with the the financial innovations, but the
transaction income grows with the faster rate. Figure 8 shows the financiers’ fees and transac-
tion income when the number of assets increases.
The transaction income grows due to the fact that new asset open more opportunities for
financiers earns money from the asset market. There is no uncertainty in the fees financiers are
paid, so they only hold assets if the expected income outweighs the variance of assets’ payoffs.
Financiers always earn the positive expected transaction income. This fundamentally differs
from the purpose of hedging the production risks when entrepreneurs hold assets.
The divergent trend of income growth between the different types of agents is the most
crucial insight in our simple model. This numerical result confirms the two income inequality
trends we characterized in the theoretical results. Financial innovations push up the income of
financiers and the people in the top distribution of wealth.
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6 Conclusion
This paper builds the simple model to understand the link between the appearance of new finan-
cial assets and the income inequality trend we observed in US since 1980. The model predicts
that new assets lead to two trends in the income distribution. First, the income share of the
financial sector will go up, due to both the consulting fees and the profits they earn from the
transactions in asset market. Second, the cycle between wealth inequality to income inequality
will become more severe, as new assets allow the better risk-sharing and therefore raise the rate
of return on capital. Both predictions of the model are very consistent with the data trend from
1980.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Lemma 1:
In case of no access to the financial market, the entrepreneur problem can be rewritten as:
max
kUi,e
(W′iµ + z)(k
U
i,e)
η − θ
2
σi(kUi,e)
2η (14)
subject to
kUi,e ≤ e
With 1/2≤ η < 1, the objective function is strictly concave. Let γ be the Lagrangian multiplier with the
resource constraint, take the first order condition of (14) with respect to kUi,e:
η(W′iµ + z)(k
U
i,e)
η−1−θησi(kUi,e)2η−1+ γ = 0
γ ≥ 0, e− kUi,e ≥ 0, γ(e− kUi,e) = 0
Assume γ = 0, then let kˆUi,e be the unique positive solution of the first order condition:
kˆUi,e =
(
W′iµ + z
θσi
)1/η
The optimal choice of capital for the entrepreneur in the autarky case will be:
kUi,e = min{kˆUi,e , e}
Lemma 2:
First, let t = (ki,e)η and β = 1/η (1 < β ≤ 2), so we rewrite the problem as:
max
t≥0
(e−xi,e′p)s+(W′iµ + z)t− stβ +xi,e′A′µ −wi,e−
θ
2
(
σit2+xi,e′ΩAxi,e+2txi,e′λ i
)
(15)
We prove the Lemma 2 in two steps. First, under the Assumption (1) and s > 0, we prove the objective
function (15 is strictly concave. Then we only need to examine the first order condition.
Let yi,e = [xi,e′ t]′ ∈ RH+1, so
Var(ni,e) = y′i,eΛiyi,e ≥ 0 ∀yi,e ∈ RH+1
where Λi =
 ΩA λ i
λ ′i σi

So, we have Λi is positive-semidefinite. Moreover ΩA is positive definite, then the Schur complement of
ΩA in Λi is S = σi−λ ′iΩ−1A λ i ≥ 0. Under the Assumption 1, we have (σi−λ ′iΩ−1A λ i)> 0.
Now we are ready to prove the objective function is strictly concave. Let Hi be the Hessian matrix of the
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objective function (15). Then:
−Hi = θ
 ΩA λ i
λ ′i σi+ sθ β (β −1)tβ−2

With 1 < β ≤ 2, s > 0 and (σi− λ ′iΩ−1A λ i) > 0 we have the Schur complement of ΩA in the matrix
(−1/θ)Hi is positive:
σi+
s
θ
β (β −1)tβ−2−λ ′iΩAλ i > 0
So (−Hi) is positive definite or Hi is negative definite. We finish the first part of the proof such that the
objective function is strictly concave when t > 0.
Take the first order condition with respect to t and xi,e (then replace t = (ki,e)η ):
(W′iµ + z)− sβ (ki,e)η(β−1)−θσi(ki,e)η −θxi,e′λ i = 0
(A′µ −ps)−θ(ΩAxi,e+(ki,e)ηλ i) = 0
Lemma 3:
The mean and variance of financers’ net worth:
E(nF) = (−x′Fp)s+x′FA′µ +wi,e
Var(nF) = x′FΩAxF
The financier’s problem can be rewritten as:
max
xF
(
(−x′Fp)s+x′FA′µ +wi,e
)− θ
2
x′FΩAxF (16)
As ΩA is positive definite, the objective function in (16) is strictly concave. Take the first order condition
of (16) with respect to xF, we have:
−ps+A′µ −θΩAxF = 0
⇐⇒ xF = Ω
−1
A (A
′µ −ps)
θ
Lemma 4:
Let χ = exp(θwi,e). As the values Vˆi,e, VUi,e and V NF are independent of wi,e and negative, we can rewrite
the problem as:
min
χ
(
χVˆi,e−VUi,e
)α( 1
χ
−1)1−α
Take the first order condition of the above function with respect to χ:
αVˆi,e
(
χVˆi,e−VUi,e
)α−1( 1
χ
−1)1−α +(1−α)(− 1
χ2
)(
χVˆi,e−VUi,e
)α( 1
χ
−1)−α = 0
⇐⇒ αVˆi,e
( 1
χ
−1)+(1−α)(− 1
χ2
)(
χVˆi,e−VUi,e
)
= 0
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⇐⇒ −αVˆi,eχ2+(2α−1)Vˆi,eχ+(1−α)VUi,e = 0 (17)
We have −α(1−α)Vˆi,eVUi,e < 0, so the equation (17) always have an unique positive solution χ∗, which
is:
χ∗ =
2α−1
2α
+
√√√√(2α−1
2α
)2
+
(1−α)
α
(
VUi,e
Vˆi,e
)
In the case α = 0.5, we have
χ2 =
VUi,e
Vˆi,e
In all case, the wage is increasing with the difference between certainty equivalent net worth of matched
entrepreneur and unmatched entrepreneur. To see it clearly, let nˆi,e be the net worth of a matched en-
trepreneur if he can access to the financial market and pay nothing to financiers:
VUi,e
Vˆi,e
= exp
{
θ
[(
E(nˆi,e)− θ2 Var(nˆi,e)
)− (E(nUi,e)− θ2 Var(nUi,e))
]}
Lemma 5:
Let ti = (ki)η ≥ 0 and 1 < β = 1/η ≤ 2. We can rewrite the the social planner’s problem as:
min
ti≥0,xi
Y =−
[
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)ti−
θ
2
(
σi(ti)2+xi′ΩAxi+2tixi′λ i
)]
+
θ I
2
x′FΩAxF (18)
subject to
I
∑
i=1
(ti)β ≤ Ie˜ (19)
I
∑
i=1
xi+ IxF = 0 (20)
First we prove the objective function is strictly convex. Recall the matrix Λi we define from the Lemma
2. Let H be the Hessian matrix of the objective function (18). Then:
H =

θΛ1 0 · · · 0 0
0 θΛ2 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · θΛI 0
0 0 · · · 0 θ IΩA

From the Lemma 2, all Λi are positive definite under the Assumption (1). We also have ΩA is positive
definite. So H is positive definite. The objective function is strictly convex. We also have the feasible
set C is convex and closed (set is created by the intersection of two constraints (19) and (20)). Now, we
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prove the objective function is coercive on C.
From the constraint (19), 0≤ ti ≤ (Ie˜)η ,∀i. So :(
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)ti
)
is bounded
Let yi = [xi′ ti]′ and recall positive definite matrix Λi from the Lemma 2. Let f be the objective function
in (18)
f (y1, ...,yI,xF) =
θ
2
(
I
∑
i=1
yi′Λiyi+ Ix′FΩAxF
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→+∞ when ‖(y1,...,yI,xF)‖→∞
−
(
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)ti
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bounded on C
So we have the objective function is coercive on C as ∀(y1, ...,yI,xF) ∈ C, f (y1, ...,yI,xF)→ +∞
whenever ‖(y1, ...,yI,xF)‖→+∞.
To shorten the notation we denote z = (y1, ...,yI,xF). As f is coercive on C, we prove the set
S = {z ∈ C| f (z) ≤ 0} is non-empty and compact. First, if we set z = 0, then f (z) = 0, so the set
{z ∈ C| f (z) ≤ 0} is non empty. Function f is continuous on C, implying the set S is closed. So to
prove the compactness, we only need to prove {z ∈C| f (z)≤ 0} is bounded. Assume it is not bounded,
then there must exist a sequence {zν} ⊂ C with ‖zν‖ → ∞. By the coercivity of f , we must also have
f (zν)→ +∞. This contradicts the fact that f (z) ≤ 0. So the set S must be bounded. Then S must be
compact.
Now apply the Weierstrass’s Theorem, as f is continuous in the compact set S, there must exist z∗
such that f attains the minimum value in S. So f also attains the minimum value in C at z∗. Moreover, f
is strictly convex in C, so z∗ is unique.
Theorem 1:
We prove the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in three steps. First, we prove every market
equilibrium’s allocation (if exists) is also the solution of social planner’s problem in Lemma 5. Second,
we prove the unique solution of social planner’s problem in Lemma 5 is one of market equilibria. From
the first two steps and Lemma 5, we can conclude the market equilibrium exists and be unique.
Step 1: Under the Assumption (1)-(2), every market equilibrium’s allocation (if exists) is also the
solution of social planner’s problem in Lemma 5.
Consider again the social planner problem in Lemma 5. Let ν ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian multiplier
with the resource constraint (19) and a γ = (γ1, ...,γH) be the Lagrangian multipliers with the portfolio
constraints (20).
Take the first order condition (for ti after we take the FOC w.r.t ti then we replace ti = (ki)η ) , we
have:
− (W′iµ + z)+νβ (ki)η(β−1)+θσi(ki)η +θxi′λ i = 0, i = 1, ..., I (21)
θΩAxi+θ(ki)ηλ i− γ = 0, i = 1, ..., I (22)
θ IΩAxF− Iγ = 0 (23)
ν ≥ 0,
I
∑
i=1
ki ≤ Ie˜, ν
(
I
∑
i=1
ki− Ie˜
)
= 0 (24)
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I∑
i=1
xi+ IxF = 0 (25)
From the Lemma 5, every allocation satisfies the system of equations from (21)-(25) will be the
solution of social planner’s problem.
If we set ν = s ≥ 0, γ = (A′µ −ps), then from Lemma 2, every market equilibrium allocation will
be the solution of the system (21)-(25), so they are solutions of the social planner’s problem.
Step 2: Under the Assumption (1)-(2), the planner’s solution is one of the market equilibrium.
Let {k∗i ,xi∗,xF∗,ν∗,γ ∗} be the solution of the social planner problem. We will prove ν∗ > 0 under
the Assumption (1)-(2).
Sum the equations (22) across i, then add with (23):
θΩA(
I
∑
i=1
xi∗+ IxF∗)+θ
I
∑
i=1
(k∗i )
ηλ i = 2Iγ
→γ = θ
2I
I
∑
i=1
(k∗i )
ηλ i (Use 25) (26)
Substitute (26) back into (22):
xi∗ =−(k∗i )ηΩ−1A λ i +
Ω−1A
2I
I
∑
i=1
(k∗i )
ηλ i (27)
We put (27) into (21):
(W′iµ + z)−νβ (k∗i )1−η −θσi(k∗i )η =−θ(k∗i )ηλ ′iΩ−1A λ i +
θ
2I
I
∑
j=1
(k∗j)
ηλ ′iΩ
−1
A λ i (28)
Sum (28) across i:
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)−νβ (k∗i )1−η −θσi(k∗i )η =−
θ
2
I
∑
i=1
(k∗i )
ηλ ′iΩ
−1
A λ i (29)
We prove under the Assumption (2), (29) fails to happen when ν = 0. Assume ν = 0, the RHS of (29) is
negative in the feasible set, we prove the LHS is positive. Consider the following subproblem:
min g(k1, ...,kI) =
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)−θσi(ki)η
subject to
ki ≥ 0,
I
∑
i=1
ki ≤ Ie˜
Solve the above subproblem, we have:
ming =
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)−θσi(σ˜iIe˜)η ; where σ˜i =
σ1/(1−η)i
∑Ij=1σ
1/(1−η)
j
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Under the Assumption (2), ming > 0. So LHS of (29) is positive. We must have ν>0.
Then there is a allocation with ki,e = k∗i , xi,e = xi∗, s = ν∗ > 0 and p = (A′µ − γ ∗)/ν∗ which is a
market equilibrium.
As from Lemma 5, the social planner’s solution exists and be unique. Then from the proof in Step 1
and 2, the market equilibrium exists and be unique.
Theorem 2:
(i) From the Theorem 2, we know that the social planner problem is identical to the market solution under
two assumptions. For the economy ξ ′, the certainty equivalent net worth of the whole economy Y ′ with
(H +1) asset is:
Y ′ = max
ki,xi
[
I
∑
i=1
(W′iµ + z)(ki)
η − θ
2
(
σi(ki)2η +xi′ΩAxi+2(ki)ηxi′λ i
)]
− θ I
2
x′FΩAxF
subject to
I
∑
i=1
ki ≤ Ie˜
I
∑
i=1
xi+ IxF = 0
If we impose the another constraint to restrict the use of asset (H+1) th such that xH+1i = 0 ∀i ∈ I, and
xH+1F = 0 then the problem become the one when the social planner faces with the economy with only H
assets. So we must have Y ′ ≥ Y as we have less constraint.
(ii) Let YN be the sum of certainty equivalent net worth for all entrepreneurs if they cannot access to
the financial market. We have YN be a constant, in detail:
YN =
I
∑
i=1
e¯∫
e
(
E(nUi,e)−
θ
2
Var(nUi,e)
)
f (e)de
Use the equation wage bargaining in case α = 0.5 and take log both sides:
wi,e =
1
2
[(
E(nˆi,e)− θ2 Var(nˆi,e)
)− (E(nUi,e)− θ2 Var(nUi,e))
]
So the difference between Y and YN could be consider as the value added of the financial sector and
Y −YN = 2YF . As Y ′ ≥ Y and YN does not change when we add a new asset, we have Y ′F ≥ YF .
(iii) We rewrite:
ϕ =
YF
Y
=
YF
2YF +YN
When we add a new asset, YF increases, YN is a positive constant so ϕ also increases.
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Lemma 6 :
If the risks of two sectors are perfectly negative correlated, λ 1 = −λ 2, σ1 = σ2 = σ and λ ′1Ω−1A λ 1 =
λ ′2Ω
−1
A λ 2 = λ
′Ω−1A λ . From the equation (28) in the proof of theorem 1, we have:
z−νβ (k∗1)1−η −θ(σ −λ ′Ω−1A λ )(k∗1)η = z−νβ (k∗2)1−η −θ(σ −λ ′Ω−1A λ )(k∗2)η (30)
Under the Assumption 1, in the proof of Lemma 2, we have σ −λ ′Ω−1A λ > 0. Consider the function:
f (k) = z−νβ (k)1−η −θ(σ −λ ′Ω−1A λ )(k)η
This function is decreasing in k, therefore the equation (30) only happens when k∗1 = k
∗
2. Now substitute
this result in the equation (27), we have x1 =−x2, therefore xF = 0. The financiers’ transaction income
is 0.
Lemma 7 :
Consider the economy with only one production sector, then k∗1 = e˜. Substitute this result into (26) and
(27), we get:
x∗1 =−
1
2
e˜ηΩ−1A λ 1
γ =
θ
2
e˜ηλ 1
From xF =−x1 and γ = A′µ − sp, the expected financiers’ transaction income :
xF′(A′µ − sp) = θ4 e˜
2ηλ ′1Ω
−1
A λ 1
Using the direct result from the Lemma 8 , we have the expected financiers’ transaction income is weakly
increasing when new asset is added into the economy.
Lemma 8 :
First, both Ω˜A and ΩˆA are positive definite matrices. We denote A as the asset matrix in (ξ ) and AH+1
as the new asset:
Q = Ω˜−1A −
 Ωˆ−1A 0
0′ 0
=
 1κ Ωˆ−1A bb′Ωˆ−1A − 1κ Ωˆ−1A b
− 1κ b′Ωˆ
−1
A
1
κ

where b = A′ΩAH+1; κ = AH+1′ΩAH+1−b′Ωˆ−1A b
Now we prove κ > 0. As Ω˜A is invertible, κ 6= 0. We have:
κ = AH+1′
(
Ω−ΩA(A′ΩA)−1A′Ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D
AH+1
Consider a matrix M:
M =
 A′ΩA A′Ω
ΩA Ω

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M is positive-semidefinite as Ω is positive definite and the Schur complement of (Ω) in M is A′ΩA−
A′ΩΩ−1ΩA = 0 . So we have the Schur complement of A′ΩA in M is positive semidefinite, and it is D.
So we have κ ≥ 0 and κ 6= 0 then κ > 0.
The matrix (κQ) is positive definite as 1 > 0 and the Schur complement of 1 in (κQ) is 0. As κ > 0, Q
is also positive semidefinite.
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